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Abstract 
 
 
The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated two-action games with 
local monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of partners, of 
whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that for generic beliefs efficiency 
can be sustained in a sequential equilibrium in which strategies are independent of the 
players’ beliefs about the monitoring structure. Stronger results are obtained when 
players are arbitrarily patient and payoffs are evaluated according to Banach-Mazur 
limits, and when players are impatient and only acyclic monitoring structures are 
allowed. 
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1 Introduction
In many strategic environments, interaction is local and segmented. Competing neigh-
borhood stores by and large serve di¤erent yet overlapping sets of customers, the be-
havior of the residents of an apartment block a¤ects their contiguous neighbors to a
larger extent than neighbors in a di¤erent block, a nations foreign or domestic policy
typically generates larger externalities for neighboring nations than for remote ones.
The objective of this paper is to study innitely repeated two-action games with
local interaction and information, and to characterize the e¢ cient equilibria. Our ap-
proach is very general. The setup consists of a nite number of players who choose in
every period whether to cooperate or defect. A graph that represents the monitoring
structure is realized at the beginning of the game. Each player is privately informed of
his neighborhood, namely the subset of players with whom he will interact in bilateral
relationships for an innite number of periods, but receives no information as to other
playersneighborhoods. A player cannot discriminate among his neighbors by choosing
di¤erent actions, that is, a players stage-game action applies to all bilateral relation-
ships in his neighborhood. All the players play the same game in all neighborhoods.
We will show that, for su¢ ciently high discount rates and generic beliefs about
the monitoring structure, all symmetric games admit sequential equilibria in which
the e¢ cient stage-game outcome is played in every period. Moreover, the equilibrium
strategies are robust with respect the playersbeliefs. The di¢ culty in the construc-
tion of equilibrium strategies that support e¢ ciency when the playersdiscount rate
is smaller than one is the preservation of incentive compatibility after some particular
histories of play. When defections spread through a networks, two main complications
are present. The rst occurs when a player expects future defection from a particular
direction. In a cycle, for example, when a player does not respond to defections, he
may expect future defections from the opposite direction caused by players who are
responding to defections. This players short term incentives depend on the timing and
on the number of future defections that he expects. We will circumvent this di¢ culty
via the construction of consistent beliefs that attach zero probability this occurrence.
The assumption that priors are non generic will be essential for this task. The second
complication arises when a player has faced a large number of defection to which he has
failed to respond. On the one hand, matching the number of defections of the opponent
in the future may not be incentive compatible, say when this player is currently achiev-
ing e¢ cient payo¤s with a large number of di¤erent neighbors. On the other hand, not
matching the number of defections of the opponent may give rise to the circumstances
outlined in the rst type of complications, that is, this player may then expect future
defections reaching him from a di¤erent direction. The former hurdle will be circum-
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vented by bounding the length of punishments and the latter, as before, constructing
appropriate consistent beliefs.
The above di¢ culties do not arise when players are patient or network cycles are
rules out. Indeed, stronger results are obtained for the case of limit discounting in which
payo¤s are evaluated according to Banach-Mazur limits. We will show that e¢ ciency
is resilient to histories of defections. In particular, there exists a sequential equilibrium
such that, after any nite sequence of defections, paths eventually converge to an innite
play of e¢ cient actions in all neighborhoods. A similar result is obtained for discount
rates below one when only acyclic monitoring structures are allowed.
Although our formal analysis is restricted to symmetric games, the above equilibria
are robust with respect to heterogeneity in payo¤s and discount rates, and with respect
to uncertainty in payo¤s and population size, as long as the ordinal properties of the
stage games are maintained across the players. We conclude the analysis showing that,
when payo¤s and discount rates are homogeneous across players, e¢ ciency is obtained
in the Prisoners Dilemma for all possible beliefs, including degenerate ones.
This paper ts within the literature on community enforcement in repeated games
pioneered by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). Several subsequent contributions have
focused on sustaining full cooperation as the players become arbitrarily patient. These
include Ahn (1997), Ali and Miller (2008), Bloch, Genicot, and Ray (2008), Deb (2009),
Fainmesser (2010), Fainmesser and Goldberg (2011), Jackson et al (2010), Kinateder
(2008), Lippert and Spagnolo (2008), Mihm, Toth and Lang (2009), Takahashi (2008),
and Vega-Redondo (2006). Most of these studies invoke strong assumptions on the
monitoring structure and the symmetry of the environment. The main comparative
advantages of our paper consist in the generality of our framework and in the formula-
tion of equilibrium strategies that are sequentially rational for generic proles of beliefs
over the monitoring structure.
Cho (2010), (2011), Xue (2004) and Wolitzki (2011) consider monitoring environ-
ments closely related to ours but focus their analysis on Prisoners Dilemma payo¤s.
Cho (2010) considers acyclical networks and allows neighbors to communicate. Cho
(2011) shows the existence of a sequential equilibrium in which players cooperate in
every period and cooperation eventually resumes after deviations if public randomiza-
tion is allowed. Although the monitoring structure in Cho (2011) is common knowledge,
the proof of our last result on the Prisoners Dilemma is extremely similar. Xue (2004)
restricts the analysis to linear networks. Wolitzki (2011) investigates the maximal level
of cooperation that can be enforced for xed discount rates in a public good game and
assumes that players learn the global monitoring structure at the end of each period.
The next section presents the setup and denes the relevant equilibrium properties.
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Sections 3 considers games in which players are arbitrarily patient and proves the ex-
istence of cooperative equilibria. Such equilibria are proven to be independent of the
playersbeliefs on the monitoring structure, and to satisfy a desirable notion of stability
and several other robustness properties. Section 4 considers games with impatient play-
ers and shows how the results extend under very mild assumptions on the admissible
beliefs over monitoring structure. Section 5 summarizes the results and concludes the
paper.
2 Setup And Equilibrium Properties
We rst introduce the setup and the information structure. Then, we proceed to dene
the solution concept and equilibrium properties.
2.1 The Stage Game
Consider a game, the stage game, played by a set N of n players in which any player i
interacts with a subset of players Ni of size ni, which we call the neighborhood of player
i. We assume that j 2 Ni if and only if i 2 Nj. This structure of interaction denes an
undirected graph (N;G) in which ij 2 G if and only if j 2 Ni. We shall refer to G as
to the information network. Dene a path to be an m tuple of players (j1; ::; ; jm) such
that jk+1 2 Njk , k = 1; 2:::;m  1. If jm = j1, a path is a cycle. Given a neighborhood
Ni for player i, let   (Ni) be the information networks in which player is neighborhood
is Ni.
Players are privately informed about their neighborhood. In particular, the beliefs
of player i regarding the information network, conditional upon observing his neigh-
borhood, are derived from a common prior distribution f over the set of information
networks.1 We will say that a prior distribution f is admissible if, for any i 2 N and
M  Nnfig, f (G) > 0 for some G for which Ni = M . To ensure that posterior beliefs
are well dened, we will assume that priors are admissible.
The set of actions of player i is denoted by Ai. It consists of only two actions
labeled fC;Dg. Throughout, we will refer to action C as cooperation and to action
D as defection. A player must choose the same action for all his neighbors, that is,
a player cannot discriminate across neighbors and his action is played in his entire
neighborhood. Given a subsetM of players, let AM denote j2MAj and aM an element
of AM . We will often use  i to denote Nnfig. The payo¤ of any player is separable
across neighborsactions. Let ij dene the emphasis of player i in the relationship
1The assumption that priors are common is inessential.
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with player j. We assume that ij > 0 for any ij, i 6= j. The stage game payo¤ of
player i is
vi(ai; aNi) =
P
j2Ni ijuij(ai; aj)
where uij(ai; aj), the payo¤ of player i in the relationship ij 2 G, is given by
i n j C D
C 1  l
D 1 + g 0
We adopt the convention that payo¤s are equal zero when Ni is empty. For simplicity,
the above payo¤ matrix is common to all bilateral relationships. We will clarify along
the analysis when this assumption can be dispensed with.
We restrict attention to stage games payo¤s for which mutual cooperation is e¢ cient.
We will also assume that defection is a best response when the opponent cooperates
to rule out the trivial case in which mutual cooperation is an equilibrium of the stage
game. Such conditions in this setup amount the following assumption.
Assumption A1: g   l < 1, g > 0.
Payo¤s are common knowledge. Throughout the paper, we will discuss the extent to
which this assumption is necessary. Naturally, if l > 0, the stage game has a unique
Bayes Nash equilibrium in which all players play D. If l < 0, the stage game always
possesses a mixed strategy Bayes Nash equilibrium.2
2.2 The Repetition
The players play the innite repetition of the stage game. The information network
is realized prior to the beginning of the game and remains constant thereafter. In
every period, a player observes only the past play of his neighbors. The set of possible
histories for player i 2 N whose realized neighborhood is Ni is dened as
Hi;Ni = f;g [ f[1t=1
ts=1ANi[figg
where ; denotes the empty history. An interim strategy for player i with neighborhood
Ni is a function i;Ni that assigns to each history in Hi;Ni an action in fC;Dg. The
set of interim strategies of player i is i;Ni . A strategy i of player i is a collection of
interim strategies fi;MgMNnfig. The set of strategies of player i is i.
2Pure strategy equilibria may also exist for some priors. In particular, if beliefs are concentrated
on graphs with cycles of even length, pure equilibria exist.
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Players discount the future with a common factor   1. Fix a network G. Given
a prole of strategies N = (1; 2; ::; n), let fatNg1t=0 be the sequence of stage-game
actions generated by N when the information network is G, and fvi(ati; atNig1t=1 be the
sequence of stage game utilities of player i. Dene
wti (N jG) =
Pt
s=1
vi(a
s
i ; a
s
Ni
)
t
to be the average payo¤ up to period t and wi (N jG) = fwti (N jG)g1t=1 to be the
sequence of average payo¤s. Repeated game payo¤s conditional on network G are
dened as
Ui(N jG) =
(
(1  )P1t=1 t 1vi(ati; atNi) if  < 1
 (wi (N jG)) if  = 1
where  () denotes the Banach-Mazur limit of a sequence. If `1 denotes the set of
bounded sequences of real numbers, a Banach-Mazur limit is a linear functional  :
`1 ! R such that: (i) (e) = 1 if e = f1; 1; :::g; (ii) (x1; x2; :::) = (x2; x3; :::) for any
sequence fxtg1t=0 2 `1 (see [4]). It can be shown that, for any sequence fxtg1t=0 2 `1,
lim inft!1 xt  
 fxtg1t=1  lim supt!1 xt
Remark 1 For simplicity, we will restrict players to use pure strategies. Since player
is beliefs assign positive probability to a nite number of paths for any history in Hi;Ni,
linearity ensures that expectation of the Banach-Mazur limit is the same as the Banach-
Mazur limit of the expectation. Our analysis can be extended to mixed strategies with
innite supports by using special Banach-Mazur limits, called medial limits, which can
be shown to exists under the continuum hypothesis (see [1]).
Dene the set of histories for the entire game to be
H = f;g [ f[1t=1
ts=1ANg
Given a history h 2 H, the realization of an information network G, and a prole of
strategies N = (1; 2; ::; n), dene the prole hN;G = (
h
1;N1
; h2;N2 ; ::; 
h
n;Nn
) induced
by the history h and information network G in the standard way. A pair (G; h) will
be referred to as a node. A pair (Ni; hi) of a neighborhood and an observed history, or
simply an observed history hi as the components of hi identify the neighbors of player
i, is associated uniquely with information set U (hi) and viceversa. With some abuse
of notation, we will sometimes use hi to denote U (hi).
A system of beliefs  denes at each information set U (hi) of player i a conditional
belief  (G; hjhi) of each node (G; h) 2 U (hi). The marginal belief of a network G is
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denoted by  (Gjhi) and of a history h by  (hjhi).
2.3 Equilibrium Properties
This section denes four properties of equilibria that we wish to characterize. The rst
is a renement of sequential equilibrium that requires a strategy to be optimal for any
possible beliefs on the information network.
Denition (Ex-Post Equilibrium EP): A strategy prole is an ex-post equilibrium
if it is a sequential equilibrium for any admissible prole of beliefs.
In addition to its obvious robustness properties, this renement simplies the analysis
considerably. Updating beliefs on the network has no e¤ect on behavior and incentives.
The second property is straightforward and selects equilibria in which cooperation
is played along the equilibrium path.
Denition (Collusive C): A strategy prole is collusive if, along the equilibrium
path, all the players play C in every period for any realized information network.
The nal two properties characterize the robustness of an equilibrium to occasional
defections by players. The rst denition is similar to, yet marginally stronger than,
the notion of global stability dened in Kandori (1992).
Denition (Finite Time Stability FTS): A strategy prole satises nite time
stability if, given any information network G and any history h 2 H, there exist a
period T hG such that all the players play C in all periods greater than T
h
G.
The nal property di¤ers from FTS in that it only requires players to believe that
reversion to full cooperation will occur in a nite time.
Denition (Belief Finite Time Stability BFTS): A strategy prole satises
belief nite time stability if, given any history hi 2 Hi;Ni observed by player i 2 N ,
player i believes with probability 1 that there exists a period T hi such that all the
players play C in all periods greater than T hi .
3 Patient Players
In this section we will show that, when  = 1, cooperation can be achieved via a strategy
prole that satises FTS. To formulate the equilibrium strategies, rst dene a pair of
state variables, (dij; dji) 2 N2+, for each relationship ij 2 G. Both state variables depend
only on the history of past play within the relationship and are therefore common
knowledge for players i and j. The number dij represents the number of periods in
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which player i will have to play D as a consequence of the past play in relationship
ij. The state variablestransitions are constructed so that (i) unilateral deviations to
D are punished with an additional D by the opponent; (ii) unilateral deviations to
C are punished with an additional D both by the player and by his opponent; (iii)
simultaneous deviations to D are not punished. Thus, the transition rule for (dij; dji)
is dened as follows. In the rst period, dij = 0 for any ij 2 G. Thereafter, for any
history h 2 H leading to state (dij; dji) in the relationship ij, if actions (ai; aj) are
chosen by players i and j, the states evolve according to the following transition rule,
where dij denotes the change in the variable dij and the + sign a strictly positive
value:
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + +
ai D D C C D D C C D D C C
aj D C D C D C D C D C D C
dij 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1  1 0 1 0
dji 0 1 0 0 0 2  1 1  1 1 0 0
(1)
Let dij (hi) denote the value of dij following a history hi 2 Hi;Ni . We will often abuse
notation and dene dij (h) for a history h 2 H, where the terms not in hi enter vacuously.
Dene the interim strategy  i;Ni : Hi;Ni ! fC;Dg as
 i;Ni(hi) =
(
C if maxj2Ni dij (hi) = 0
D if maxj2Ni dij (hi) > 0
This interim strategy instructs each player i to defect if and only if at least one of
his requirednumber of defections dij is positive. The strategy  i of player i is the
collection interim strategies f i;MgMNnfig. A prole of such strategies will be denoted
by N .
Note that, if dij > dji, the states return to (0; 0) after dji period of (D;D) and
dij   dji periods of (D;C). Hence, dij may be interpreted as the number of defections
that players i and j require from player i in the future to return to the initial state.
The next theorem shows that such a strategy prole satises the three properties in
Section 2.
Theorem 1 Suppose that A1 holds and  = 1. The strategy prole N satises EP, C,
and FTS.
The proof of Theorem 1 exploits two crucial attributes of the above strategies. First,
the strategy prole N satises FTS. For a crude intuition, consider Figures 1 and 2.
8
Figure 1: The time period is denoted by t. The number next to a vertex inside the
graph denotes the player, the letter next to a vertex outside the graph denotes the
action chosen in period t (the letter is underlined if the player is deviating), and the
outside numbers on an edge denote the pair (dij; dji) at the beginning of the period.
The number next to each vertex inside the graph denotes a player, the outside letter
the actions, and the outside numbers on each edge the pair (dij; dji). Consider the
pentagon in Figure 1. A deviation of player 1 spreads along the cycle and is stopped by
the simultaneous play of D by players 3 and 4. Consider now the hexagon. Defections
stop spreading because they reach player 4 simultaneously. Note how the play of D
which originates from player 1, moves away from player 1 in both directions. That is,
player 1 is a sourceof Ds. In the pentagon, after players 2 and 5 play D, the play
of D moves way from these players as well, that is, players 2 and 3 become sources.
Our proof strategy generalizes this observation: there always exists a source player and
the set of source players expands. Figure 2 provides additional intuition about the
annihilationof Ds that occurs when players conform to the prole N . Note that
the graph has two cycles. Consider a history of length 10 in which player 1 deviates
in the rst period only, player 2 does not respond and does play C for the rst 10
period, and all other players always conform to the prole N . The rst plot of Figure
2, depicts the state of play at the beginning of period 10 when player 2 will play his
nal deviation to C. By period 15, d21 = d23 and no player except player 2 will play D.
Thus, defections will die out in 5 periods. Note one additional feature of N : when the
play reverts to cooperation in all relationships, all connected players will have played
the same number of Ds.
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Figure 2: The time period is denoted by t. The number next to a vertex inside the
graph denotes the player, the letter next to a vertex outside the graph denotes the
action chosen in period t (the letter is underlined if the player is deviating), and the
outside numbers on an edge denote the pair (dij; dji) at the beginning of the period.
Second, the tit for tatnature of the prole N ensures that, in any relationship,
a play of (D;C) is always matched by a later play of (C;D). Hence, a payo¤ of 1 + g
is followed by a payo¤ of  l. Assumption A1 and FTS thus guarantee that, after any
history, conforming to the prole N yields an average payo¤ at least as large as the
average payo¤ from any deviation.
We rst establish that the strategy prole N satises FTS. For any history h 2 H,
dene the excess defection in a relationship to be eij (h) = dij (h)   dji (h). Fix an
information network G and, for any history h 2 H and any path  = (j1; ::; ; jm), dene
E(h) =
Pm 1
k=1 ejkjk+1 (h)
to be the sum of the excess defections along the path. Let Pif be the set of paths with
initial vertex i and terminal vertex f and Pii the set of cycles with initial vertex i.
Finally, let S(h) denote the set of players such that the aggregate excess defection on
any path departing from them is non-positive, that is,
S(h) = fi 2 N : E(h)  0 for any  2 Pif , for any f 2 Ng
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Such players can be interpreted as the sources of Ds in the network in that defections
travel away from players in S(h). The next lemma shows that aggregate excess de-
fections along paths depend only on the initial and terminal vertices and that S(h) is
non-empty for any history h. Let the function I () denote the indicator function.
Lemma 2 Consider an information network G. For any history h 2 H and any action
prole a 2 AN :
(1) If  2 Pif
E(h; a) = E(h) + I (ai 6= af ) [I (ai = C)  I (ai = D)]
(2) If { 2 Pii
E{(h) = 0
(3) If ; 0 2 Pif
E(h) = E0(h)
(4) S(h) is non-empty.
Proof. The proof rst establishes (1) and then proceeds by induction to prove (2) and
(3). Consider a history (h; a). Notice that, by denition,
eij (h; a) = eij (h) + I (ai 6= aj) [I (ai = C)  I (ai = D)]
Hence, for any path  = (j1; ::; ; jm) 2 Pif :
E(h; a) = E(h) +
m 1X
k=1
I
 
ajk 6= ajk+1

[I (ajk = C)  I (ajk = D)] =
= E(h) + I (ai 6= af ) [I (ai = C)  I (ai = D)]
The last equality holds by a simple counting argument. Consider the sequence of
action pairs f ajk ; ajk+1gm 1k=1 . First remove all the pairs of action  ajk ; ajk+1 for which
ajk = ajk+1 since I
 
ajk 6= ajk+1

= 0. Since the stage game has only two actions, if the
actions played at the beginning and at the end of the path coincide (ai = af), we are
left an even number of alternating pairs. If actions played at the beginning and at the
end do not coincide (ai 6= af), we are left an odd number of alternating pairs. The
desired equality then follows.
Notice that (1) and a simple induction argument imply (2). When h is empty, (2) holds
trivially. If (2) holds for any history h, it will also hold for a history (h; a) since ai = af
in a cycle. A similar induction argument also establishes (3).
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Claim (4) is also proved by induction. When h is the empty history, dij (h) = 0 for any
ij 2 G, and (4) holds trivially since S(h) = N . Suppose that (4) holds for a history h.
Consider the history h0 = (h; a) and a player i 2 S(h). If i 2 S(h0), the claim holds.
Suppose then that i =2 S(h0). Since i 2 S(h), by (1) there exists at least one path
 2 Pij such that E(h0) = 1. We will show that this implies that j 2 S(h0). Consider
any path 0 2 Pjf and any path 00 2 Pif for any f 2 N . Note that, by (1), E00(h0)  1
and, by (3):
E0(h
0) = E00(h0)  E(h0) =
= E00(h
0)  1  E00(h)  0
which establishes (4).
The next Lemma shows that the strategy prole N satises FTS. The main idea
of the proof is that the set S (h) expands when players play according to the strategy
prole N . The intuition follows by observing that rst, when deviations travel away
from a player i 2 S (h), (dij; dji), j 2 Ni, declines, and second, if a player i is in S (h)
and has a neighbor j such that (dij (h) ; dji (h)) = (0; 0), then player j is also in S (h).
Lemma 3 The strategy prole N satises FTS.
Proof. Fix an information network G. Consider any history h 2 H of length t.
Following any history, the playersactions for the remainder of the game are determined
by N . Thus, in any relationship ij 2 G, the state transitions take place according to
the following table:
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + +
ai D D C C D C D
aj D C D C D D D
dij 0 0 1 0 0 0  1
dji 0 1 0 0 0  1  1
(2)
Let
T (h) = maxij2G fmin fdij(h); dji(h)gg :
and hs+ denote the history s periods longer than h that is generated by N after history h.
If all players play according to N after history h, for any z > T (h) all the relationships
ij will satisfy min

dij(h
z
+); dji(h
z
+)
	
= 0, that is, either dij(hz+) or dji(h
z
+) is equal to
zero. To show that the strategy satises FTS, it will be su¢ cient to prove that, for any
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history h 2 H and for any z > T (h),
(A) S(hz+)  S(hz+1+ )
(B) If S(hz+) 6= N , S(hz+) 6= S(hz+k+ ) for some k > 0
Indeed, if both statements were to hold, FTS would follow trivially as S(hz+) = N
for z su¢ ciently large, and S(hz+) = N if and only if maxij2G

dij(h
z
+)
	
= 0. We
establish (A) by contradiction. Consider a player i such that i 2 S(hz+) for z > T (h)
and i =2 S(hz+1+ ). Then, there exists a path  2 Pif such that
E(h
z
+) = 0 and E(h
z+1
+ ) = 1
Since i 2 S(hz+), by (1) of Lemma 2, f
 
hz+

= D. For player f to choose D along the
equilibrium path it must be that dfk(hz+) > 0 for some k 2 Nf . Since z > T (h), by
denition it must be that dkf (hz+) = 0 and thus, for 
0 2 Pik,
E0(h
z
+) = E(h
z
+) + efk(h
z
+) = efk(h
z
+) > 0
which contradicts that i 2 S(hz+). Hence, (A) must hold.
For the proof of (B), take j 2 Ni such that i 2 S(hz+) and j =2 S(hz+) for z > T (h).
Notice that such player i must exist by (4) of Lemma 2. By (A), dij(hz+z
0
+ ) = 0 for any
z0  0. Since
dji(h
z+z0+1
+ ) = max
n
dji(h
z+z0
+ )  1; 0
o
for any z0  0, it follows that dji(hz+z0+ ) = 0 for any z0 > dji(hz+). The claim follows
noting that, for any history h, if eij (h) = 0 and i 2 S(h), then j 2 S(h).
We will use Lemmas 2 and 3 to prove Theorem 1. The intuition for the nal leg of this
result is that the prole N is such that, in any relationship, the number of periods
in which (D;C) is played is always matched by an equal number of periods in which
(C;D) is played.
Proof. The prole N trivially satises C. We will now show that, for any history
h 2 H,
Ui(
h
N jG)  Ui(i; h ijG)
for any interim strategy i 2 i;Ni , any G 2   (Ni), and any i 2 N . One can easily
verify that EP then follows.
Consider any history h 2 H of length z 1. Notice that by FTS, (ii) in the denition
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of Banach-Mazur limits, and linearity
Ui(
h
N jG) =
P
j2Ni ij
Hence, N is an ex post equilibrium sequential equilibrium if and only if for any player
i 2 N and for any interim strategy i 2 i;NiP
j2Ni ij  Ui(i; h ijG) for any G 2   (Ni) :
Let fatNg1t=z be the sequence of stage-game actions generated by (i; h i) after history
h when the information network is G. Dene h
t
, t  z  1, to be the history of length t
generated by the strategy prole (i; 
h
 i) after history h, that is, h
z 1
= h and, for any
t  z, ht+1 = (ht; at+1N ). Consider any relationship ij 2 G. Omitting some dependent
variables for notational convenience, dene a variable which counts how many times an
action prole (ai; aj) has been played by the pair ij between periods s and s + T in
history h
s+T
, s  z,
nsij(ai; ajjT ) =
Ps+T
t=s I
 
ati = ai

I
 
atj = aj

.
Then, from Table (1) and the denition of eij(), for any s  z,
nsij(D;Cj0)  nsij(C;Dj0) = eij(h
s 1
)  eij

h
s

which trivially implies that
nzij(D;CjT )  nzij(C;DjT ) =
PT+z
t=z
 
ntij(D;Cj0)  ntij(C;Dj0)

=
= eij(h
z 1
)  eij

h
T+z

 z(T )
Notice that eij

h
t

< 0 implies that dji

h
t

> 0, which implies that at+1j = D, which
nally implies that eij

h
t+1

 eij

h
t

. Thus, when player j plays according to j
after history h, it must be the case that, for any T , eij

h
T+z

  1, if eij(hz 1) > 0;
and eij

h
T+z

 eij(hz 1), if eij(hz 1) < 0. Hence, for some M z > 0, z(T ) M z for
every T . It follows that the payo¤ of player i in relationship ij must satisfy
PT+z
t=z uij(a
t
i; a
t
j) = n
z
ij(C;CjT ) + (1 + g)nzij(D;CjT )  lnzij(C;DjT ) =
= nzij(C;CjT ) +
1 + g   l
2
2nzij(C;DjT ) + (1 + g)z(T )
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Note that
nzij(C;CjT ) + 2nzij(C;DjT ) + nzij(D;DjT ) + z(T ) = T + 1
and that, by A1, 1 + g   l < 2. Then, since z(T ) MZ for every T ,
lim supT!1
PT+z
t=z uij(a
t
i; a
t
j)
T + 1
 1
Therefore, the Banach-Mazur limit

 (PT+z
t=z uij(a
t
i; a
t
j)
T + 1
)1
T=0
!
 1
The claim follows as Banach Mazur limits are linear.
Comments
Theorem 1 applies to several extensions of the baseline model. First, it is trivially
robust to uncertainty on the number of players. Second, payo¤s can be heterogeneous
and allowed to depend on each relationship as long as A1 holds in all relationships.
Indeed, Theorem 1 works even if payo¤s are private information as long as they satisfy
A1 in all possible realizations.
We allow a pair (dij; dji) to grow unbounded to prevent Ds from cycling around
the graph. Intuitively, suppose that ij is a relationship on a cycle. If player i fails to
respond once to a play of (C;D) in relationship ij, D propagates only in one direction
and enter a cycle. To extinguish this D, player i must play D so that D travels
in the opposite direction as well. Although the network is nite, local information
prevents the players from nding the smallest number of counterbalancingDs that
prevent periodicity of punishments. As strategies only rely on local information, all Ds
propagating in one direction must be o¤set by the same number of Ds in the opposite
direction.
Since the pair (dij; dji) can grow unbounded, players must arbitrarily patient, as
histories exist for which it is not incentive compatible to comply with the the prole
N unless  = 1. For instance, consider a large star network and a history of length T
in which one pheripheral player has always played D and the remaining players always
C. It straightforward to check that, the longer T , the larger  must be for the central
player to comply with N and that no lower bound smaller than one exists for such .
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4 Impatient Players
This section develops results for games with impatient players. The rst subsection
introduces strategies and proves preliminary results. The second subsection proves
that an equilibrium exists satisfying C, EP and FTS when only acyclic networks are
admissible. The following subsection proves that a similar result holds if the prior
distribution on the admissible networks has full support. The last subsection shows
that specic trigger strategies su¢ ce to nd equilibria satisfying C and EP in Prisoners
Dilemma type games.
4.1 Strategies and Preliminary Results
This subsection introduces a strategy that di¤ers from the strategy in Section 3 in that
the maximal number of defections expected from any player is bounded. As before, two
state variables (dij; dji) characterize the state of each relationship ij 2 G and require
each player i to defect if and only if at least one of his requirednumber of defections
dij is positive. Thus, for hi 2 Hi;Ni ,
i;Ni(hi) =
(
C if maxj2Ni dij (hi) = 0
D if maxj2Ni dij (hi) > 0
where dij (hi) is the value of dij after history hi.
The transitions for the state variables (dij; dji) di¤er from Section 3 and depend on
the sign of the parameter l which, to simplify the notation, we will systematically omit
to denote explicitly.
Case l > 0 : In the rst period, dij = 0 for any ij 2 G. Given a state (dij; dji) and
actions (ai; aj) for the relationship ij, the state in the next period is determined
by the following transition rule
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + +
ai D D C C D D C C D D C C
aj D C D C D C D C D C D C
dij 0 0 2 0 0 dji 0 dji  1 0 0 0
dji 0 2 0 0 0 0  1 0  1 0 0 0
where dij, as before, denotes the change in variable dij and the + sign a strictly
positive value.
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Case l < 0 : In the rst period, dij = 0 for any ij 2 G. Given a state (dij; dji) and
actions (ai; aj) for the relationship ij, the state in the next period is determined
by the transition rule
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + + + +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + + + + + + +
ai D D C C D D C C D D C C
aj D C D C D C D C D C D C
dij 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2  1 2  dij 2  dij 2  dij
dji 0 1 0 0  1  1  1 2  dji  1 2  dji 2  dji 2  dji
where dij, again, denotes the change in variable dij and the + sign a strictly
positive value.
Case l = 0 : Choose either transition rule.
We denote such strategy prole by N .
3 Note that for any history, (dij; dji) is
bounded by (2; 2) in all cases. These modication are made to ensure that the payo¤
of each player remains incentive compatible at any information set for discount rates
below one.
The following result is instrumental for the proof of the main theorems of this section.
It provides su¢ cient conditions under which player i never expects his neighbors to play
D because of the past play in relationships to which the player i does not belong. These
conditions are: (i) all deviations have occured in player is neighborhood; (ii) no two
neighbors of player i are linked by a path.
Given a history h 2 H of length T and a network G, let D (G; h; t) denote the set
of players who deviate from the strategy prole N in period t  T . Further dene,
D (G; h) =
T[
t=1
D (G; h; t) :
Recall that dij (h) is the value of dij following history h. A component of an undirected
graph is a maximal subgraph in which any two vertices are connected to each other by
a path. A relationship ij 2 G is a bridge in G if the deletion of the link ij from G
increases the number of components.
Lemma 4 Consider a network G, a player i 2 N , and a history h 2 H such that:
(i) D (G; h)  Ni [ fig;
3Recall that we are omitting to denote the dependence on l.
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(ii) If j 2 D (G; h) nfig, link ij is a bridge in G.
Then, djk (h) = 0 for any j 2 Ni and k 2 Njnfig.
Proof. First consider any player j 2 D (G; h) such that j 6= i. Let (N(Gj); Gj) denote
the component of the graph Gn fijg to which player j belongs. By condition (ii), such
component cannot include player i and players in Nin fjg, or else link ij would not be a
bridge. We want to establish that djk(h) = 0 for k 2 Nj, where k 6= i. Partition players
in the N(Gj) based on their distance from j. In particular, let N zj denote the set of
players in N(Gj) whose shortest path to player j contains z links and let N0j = fjg.
Clearly, N1j = Njn fig.
By induction on the history length, we will rst prove that, ifD (G; h)\N(Gj) = fjg,
then for any distance z  0, any player r 2 N zj , and any link rk 2 Gj:
drk(h) =
(
0 if k 2 NrnN z 1j
bz(h) if k 2 N z 1j
(3)
where the second condition holds only for z > 0 and bz(h) depends only on z and h,
and is independent of the identity of the two players. Observe that the claim holds the
empty history, as drk(;) = 0 for any rk 2 Gj. Further observe that for m 2 N zj and
z > 0, Nm  N z 1j [N zj [N z+1j and Nm \N z 1j 6= ;. Now assume that the claim holds
for any history of length up to T . We will show that it holds for length T + 1. Let
(hT ; a) denote a history of length T + 1, where a denotes the prole of actions chosen
in period T + 1. Observe that, for any distance z > 0 and any player r 2 N zj ,
ar = D , drk(hT ) > 0 for k 2 N z 1j (4)
since r =2 D  G; hT  and since, by the induction hypothesis, drk(hT ) = 0 for any k 2
NrnN z 1j . Thus, for any z > 0, all players in N zj must choose the same action since
drk(h
T ) = bz(h
T ) for any r 2 N zi and k 2 N z 1j \ Nr, and since N z 1j \ Nr 6= ; given
that a path exists connecting player r to player j (r belongs to component Gj). Thus,
for any distance z > 0, any player r 2 N zj , and any link rk 2 Gj,
drk(h
T ; a) = 0 if k 2 N zi
since drk(hT ) = dkr(hT ) = 0, and since ar = ak. Similarly, observe that for any distance
z  0, any player r 2 N zj , and any link rk 2 G,
drk(h
T ; a) = 0 if k 2 N z+1j
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since drk(hT ) = 0 if k 2 N z+1j , and because (4) immediately implies that drk(hT ; a) = 0,
by the transition rules. Finally note that for any distance z > 0, any player r 2 N zj ,
and any link rk 2 G,
drk(h
T ; a) = bz(h
T ; a) if k 2 N z 1j
since drk(hT ) = bz(hT ) if k 2 N z 1j , and because al = am for any two players l;m 2 N sj
for any s  0. Thus, condition (3), must hold for a history of arbitrary length in which
only players in j has deviated in component Gj. This establishes that for any history
h 2 H, if conditions (i) and (ii) in the lemma hold, djk (h) = 0, for any j 2 D (G; h) nfig
and any one of his neighbors k 2 Njnfig.
To conclude the proof consider the neighbors of player i in NinD (G; h). In par-
ticular, consider the component of the network G to which player i belongs when all
the links between player i and players in D (G; h) have been removed from the net-
work G. Label such network (N(Gi); Gi). Clearly, NinD (G; h)  N(Gi). Furthermore,
N(Gi) \ D (G; h) = fig by construction. Hence, since by condition (ii) in the lemma
N(Gi)\Gj = ; for any j 2 D (G; h) nfig, the previous induction argument can still be
used to establish that for any distance z  0, any player r 2 N zi , and any link rk 2 Gi,
drk(h) =
(
0 if k 2 NrnN z 1i
bz(h) if k 2 N z 1i
where N zi denotes the set of player at distance z  0 from i in Gi, as in the previous
part of the proof. Therefore, djk (h) = 0, for any j 2 NinD (G; h) and any one of his
neighbors k 2 Njnfig, which with the previous part of the argument establishes the
result.
4.2 Acyclic Networks and FTS
In this subsection, we circumvent the problem of (dij; dji) growing unbounded by re-
stricting the class of admissible information networks. In particular, we show that
acyclic and individually rational punishment can be constructed when only acyclic in-
formation networks are allowed and players are su¢ ciently patient. Assume that
Assumption A2: If f(G) > 0, then G is acyclic.
The strategy prole N is such that the states (dij; dji) are bounded by (2; 2) for any
history. This ensures that N remains incentive compatible and individually rational at
any information set for su¢ ciently high discount factors. In addition, as the analysis is
restricted to trees, one need not worry about the occurrence of cycles of defections.
The next theorem shows that a prole of such strategies satises the desired prop-
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erties.
Theorem 5 If A1 and A2 hold, and if  is su¢ ciently close to one, the strategy prole
N satises C, EP, and FTS.
We rst establish that the equilibrium strategy satises FTS and then we prove the
general theorem.
Lemma 6 The strategy prole N satises FTS.
Proof. Suppose that G is a tree and consider any history. For notational simplicity,
assume that G is connected. If the players play according to the prole N , the possible
transitions are given by
if l  0
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + +
ai D D C C D C D
aj D C D C D D D
dij 0 0 2 0 0 0  1
dji 0 2 0 0 0  1  1
if l  0
dij 0 0 0 0 0 0 +
dji 0 0 0 0 + + +
ai D D C C D C D
aj D C D C D D D
dij 0 0 1 0 0 0  1
dji 0 1 0 0  1  1  1
We will prove the claim by induction on the number of players. It is easily veried that
FTS holds for n = 2. Suppose that n > 2. Consider a relationship ij such that player
i is the unique neighbor of player j (player j is a terminal vertex). First note that, if
dij = 0, it will remains so for the remainder of the game. Consequently, if dij = 0, the
relationship ij is superuous for the play of player i as player i plays D if and only if
dik > 0 for some neighbor k 6= j. Hence, by induction, there exists a period t such that
the play of all the players in the network in which the relationship ij is removed is C
in all periods greater than t. Obviously, the same will hold for player j for some period
t0  t. Conversely, if dij > 0, since player js only neighbor is player i, dij will become
zero after a nite number of periods and the above argument applies again.
We now conclude the proof of theorem 5. The rst part constructs consistent beliefs
such that players believe that deviations occur only in their neighborhood. This is
achieved by denining trembles for which more recent deviations to D are innitely
more likely than less recent deviations. Such beliefs imply that any player i believes
that the action of a neighbor j 2 Ni at any history h is determined exclusively by dji(h).
The second part is a exceedingly tedious verication that sequential rationality holds.
Proof. Property C is obvious. Tables are added to the appendix to clarify the evolution
of payo¤s within a neighborhood after a defection. To prove EP, set o¤-equilibrium
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beliefs so that player i at each observed history hi 2 Hi;Ni attributes any observed
deviation only to his neighbors in Ni. Such beliefs can be derived by assuming that
the most recent deviations to D are, as trembles vanish, innitely more likely than any
earlier deviation. For example, consider trembles such that (i) a deviation to D by
player i in period t when maxj dij = 0 occurs with probability "
t
, where 1 > n 
1  ; and
a deviation to C by player i in period t when maxj dij > 0 occurs with probability "2.
As " ! 0, any nite number of deviations to D is innitely more likely than a single
deviation to C and any nite number of recent deviations to D is innitely more likely
than one earlier deviation to D.
Consider the system of beliefs  obtained taking limits as the above trembles vanish.
Then, for any history hi 2 Hi;Ni observed a player i 2 N , if (G; hjhi) > 0 for some
(G; h) 2 U(hi), then D (G; h)  Ni [ fig (see Lemma 11 in appendix). Thus, since by
A2 any link ij 2 G is a bridge, the conditions of Lemma 4 hold. Hence, for j 2 Ni
and k 2 Njnfig, djk(h0) = 0 for any history h0 which has h as a subhistory and
D (G; h0) nD (G; h)  fig. Thus, any player i believes that for any neighbor j 2 Ni,
djk(h
0) = 0 for any k 2 Njnfig. Consequently, player i believes that the action of a
neighbor j 2 Ni at any history h0 is solely determined dji(h0).
In order to check sequential rationality, we need to consider two separate cases. First
assume that l  0. Given any history, seven values of (dij; dji) are possible, namely
(0; 0), (1; 0), (0; 1), (1; 1), (0; 2), (2; 0), and (2; 2). First consider the case in which
maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 0 and thus i (hi) = C. If player i is su¢ ciently patient, he prefers
to comply with the equilibrium strategy since the payo¤ di¤erences between complying
and a one shot deviation to D with any neighbor j 2 Ni are
(1 + l)
 
 + 2
  g if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
 l + (1 + l) if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
 l + 2(1 + l) if (dij; dji) = (0; 2)
which are positive by A1 and l  0 when  is su¢ ciently close to one.
If maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1, then i (hi) = D. A one shot deviation to C causes the
maximum dij to remain equal to 1 in the next period for some j 2 Ni. The payo¤
di¤erences are
(1 + g) (1  ) + 3   1 + l  3    if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
l +
 
2 + 3

(1 + l)   (1 + g + l) if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
g +  if (dij; dji) = (1; 0)
l +  if (dij; dji) = (1; 1)
l (1  ) if (dij; dji) = (0; 2)
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As  ! 1, the rst and the last expression converge to zero, while the remaining three
expressions become strictly positive. Since maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1, a neighbor exists with
whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when  is close to 1. Since ij > 0 for
any j 2 Ni, a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for  close to 1.
Finally, suppose that max dij(hi) = 2. A one shot deviation to C causes the maxi-
mum dij to remain equal to 2 in the next period for some j 2 Ni. The payo¤di¤erences
are
(1 + g) (1  )   1  4  l  2   4 if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
 (1 + g) + 3 + 4 + (1  2 + 3 + 4)l if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
(1 + g)
 
1 +    2   1  4  l  2   4 if (dij; dji) = (1; 0)
(1 + g)
 
   2+ 4 + (1  2 + 4)l if (dij; dji) = (1; 1)
l(1  2) if (dij; dji) = (0; 2)
(1 + ) (1 + g) + 2   1 if (dij; dji) = (2; 0)
l + 2 if (dij; dji) = (2; 2)
As  ! 1 the rst and the fth expression converge to zero, while the remaining
expressions become strictly positive. Since maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 2, a neighbor exists with
whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when  is close to 1. Since ij > 0 for
any j 2 Ni, a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for  close to 1.
Next assume that l  0. Given any history, ve values of (dij; dji) are possi-
ble, namely (0; 0), (1; 0), (0; 1), (1; 1), and (2; 2). First consider the case in which
maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 0 and thus i (hi) = C. If player i is su¢ ciently patient, he prefers
to comply with the equilibrium strategy since the payo¤ di¤erences between complying
and a one shot deviation to D with any neighbor j 2 Ni are
 g + (1 + l)  if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
 l if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
As  ! 1, the rst expression is strictly positive and the second weakly positive by A1
and l  0.
If maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1, then i (hi) = D. A one shot deviation to C causes the
maximum dij to increase to 2 in the next period for some j 2 Ni. The payo¤di¤erences
are
g   (1 + g + l)  + 2 if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
l   g + 2 if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
g +  + 2 if (dij; dji) = (1; 0)
l +  + 2 if (dij; dji) = (1; 1)
As  ! 1, the rst expression is weakly positive and the remaining expressions become
strictly positive, since 1 > g   l by A1. Since maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1, a neighbor exists
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with whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when  is close to 1. Since ij > 0
for any j 2 Ni, a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for  close to 1.
Finally, suppose that max dij(hi) = 2. A one shot deviation to C causes the maxi-
mum dij to remain equal to 2 in the next period for some j 2 Ni. The payo¤di¤erences
are
g   (1 + g)  + 2 if (dij; dji) = (0; 0)
l(1  2) if (dij; dji) = (0; 1)
g + (1 + g)    l2 if (dij; dji) = (1; 0)
l(1  2) + (1 + g)  if (dij; dji) = (1; 1)
l + 2 if (dij; dji) = (2; 2)
As  ! 1, the rst and the second expression converge to zero, while the remaining
expressions become strictly positive. Since maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 2, a neighbor exists with
whom player i strictly loses by deviating to C when  is close to 1. Since ij > 0 for
any j 2 Ni, a deviation to C strictly decreases payo¤s for  close to 1.
Note that the strategy prole the strategy prole N trivially satises EP, since the
incentives to conform are not a¤ected by the beliefs about the graph.
Comments
The acyclicity of admissible graphs allows us to bound punishments since deviations
do not cycle even if the number of defections played two di¤erent neighbors are not bal-
anced. Thus, we are able to obtain FTS for impatient players. Furthermore, at any
history cooperation is restored after no more than 3n periods. All the robustness prop-
erties of the equilibrium strategy of Section 3 are satised by the equilibrium strategy
of this section provided that the ordinal properties of the games are the same across all
relationships. Uncertainty about the number of player, heterogeneity in payo¤s, and
uncertainty about payo¤s consistent with A1 can be allowed for without compromising
the results. The equilibrium in this section is also robust to heterogeneity in discount
rates.
4.3 Full Support and BFTS
This section shows how to generalize the results derived for acyclic networks to any
prior distribution with full support. We replace A2 with
Assumption A3: f(G) > 0 for any G.
Fix a player i with a neighborhood Ni. Let Gi denote the network in which Nj = fig
for any player j 2 Ni, and Nj = NnfNi [ fi; jgg for any j =2 Ni [ fig. That is, Gi
consists of an incomplete star network, in which player i is the center and the players
in Ni are the periphery, and a disjoint, totally connected component.
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Consider the strategy N . Given a history hi observed by player i when is neighbor-
hood is Ni, let h (hi) be the history such that (Gi ; h
 (hi)) 2 U (hi) and every player
j =2 Ni [ fig plays according to N (i.e. plays C) in every period. We say that player
j 2 Ni i-deviates from N at the observed history hi if
j 2 D (Gi ; h (hi))
that is, if player j does not play according to N on the path to hi when the network
is Gi .
For any history h 2 H, let again ht denote the sub-history of length t < T .
The next lemma presents a preliminary result relating the sets of defecting players
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t) and D (G; h; t) for two nodes (Gi ; h (hi)) ; (G; h) 2 U (hi).
Lemma 7 Consider a node (G; h) 2 U (hi) where history h is of length T . If
(i) D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t) = D (G; h; t) for any t < T , and
(ii) Nj = fig for any j 2 D
 
G; hT 1
 nfig,
then D (Gi ; h (hi) ; T )  D (G; h; T ).
Proof. Suppose that the (i) and (ii) hold. Observe that by denition of h (hi),
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t)  Ni [ fig.
Moreover, note that Lemma 4 can be applied to establish that for any sub-history ht
of length t < T and for any player j 2 Ni,
djk
 
ht

= 0 for k 2 Njnfig.
Now observe that, since (Gi ; h
 (hi)) ; (G; h) 2 U (hi), we must have that for any sub-
history ht of length t < T and for any player j 2 Ni,
dji
 
ht

= dji
 
h (hi)
t and dij  ht = dij  h (hi)t .
The latter observation immediately implies that if i 2 D (Gi ; h (hi) ; T ), then i 2
D (G; h; T ). Now consider a player j 2 D (Gi ; h (hi) ; T ) nfig. If player j plays C at
T , then dji

h (hi)
T 1

> 0, and thus j 2 D (G; h; T ) since dji
 
hT 1

> 0 as well.
If player j plays D at T , then dji

h (hi)
T 1

= 0, and thus j 2 D (G; h; T ) since
djk
 
hT 1

= 0 for k 2 Nj.
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The next lemma shows that it is possible to construct a consistent belief system such
that: (i) whenever a player j i-deviates, player i believes that player js neighborhood
contains only player i; (ii) all deviations are local. This is achieved by assuming that
trembles are such that a deviation by a player with a singleton neighborhood is innitely
more likely than a deviation by a player with a larger neighborhood, and such that, as
in the proof of Theorem 5, more recent deviations are innitely more likely than less
recent ones.
Lemma 8 If A3 holds, there exists a system of beliefs  consistent with strategy prole
N such that, for any player i 2 N and observed history hi of length T ,
(a) if player j 2 Ni i-deviates, then  (G; hjhi) = 0 for any (G; h) 2 U (hi) for which
G is such that Nj 6= fig;
(b) if (G; h) 2 U (hi) and for some t  T ,
D (G; h; t) 6= D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t) ,
then  (G; hjhi) = 0.
Proof. For any player i, consider trembles such that:
(i) If ni = 1, a deviation in period t from prole N occurs with probability "
t, where

1 n < 1
(ii) If ni > 1, a deviation in period t from prole N occurs with probability "
2.
Note that, for any t > 1, such trembles imply that, as " vanishes, a single deviation
of type (i) at time t < T is innitely less likely than deviations of type (i) by all the
players in periods t + 1; t + 2; :::; T since t > n
P1
s=t+1 
s. Given the sequence of
completely mixed behavior strategy proles "N obtained by adding the above trembles
to the prole N , let 
"(G; h) be the probability of node (G; h). The strategy "N is
such that, for every information set U (hi) of player i, the conditional belief of node
(G; h) 2 U (hi)
" (G; hjhi) = 
"(G; h)P
(G0;h0)2U(hi) 
"(G0; h0)
converges as "! 0, since each "(G; h) is a polynomial of the form
x
QW
k=1 (1  "yk)
QV
k=1 "
zk , (5)
for some parameters W;V  nT , x 2 (0; 1), and yk; zk 2 R+ for k in the appropriate
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range. For any node (G; h) 2 U (hi) dene
 (G; hjhi) = lim
"!0
" (G; hjhi) .
We rst establish (a). Consider (G; h) 2 U (hi). Recall that the history h (hi) is such
that (Gi ; h
 (hi)) 2 U (hi) and every player j =2 Ni [ fig, plays C in every period.
Obviously, for any j 2 Ni,
hi (j) = h
 (hi; j) = h (j)
where hi (j), h (hi; j), and h (j) denote player js play in histories hi, h (hi), and h.
Now consider a player j 2 Ni that i-deviates from N at the observed history hi.
That is, j 2 D (Gi ; h (hi)). Since at node (Gi ; h (hi)) all deviations are of type (i),
" (Gi ; h
 (hi))  f (Gi ) (1  ")nT ",
where the lower bound is obtained by setting W to be equal to nT , yk = 1 in (5) and
noting that PV
k=1 zk 
PT
t=1 n
t < 1
since 
1 n < 1. Thus, for " su¢ ciently close to zero, there exists a constant q > 0 such
that
" (Gi ; h
 (hi))  q":
The constant q is positive since, by hypothesis, f (Gi ) > 0.
Now consider a node (G0; h0) 2 U (hi) such that N 0j 6= fig, where N 0j is neighborhood
of player j in G0. Consider two separate cases:
1. First suppose that j 2 D (G0; h0). As the deviation of player j at period t is of
type (ii), " (G0; h0)  "2. Thus,
" (G0; h0jhi)  
"(G0; h0)
"(Gi ; h (hi))
 "
q
which implies that  (G0; h0jhi) = 0. Thus, the claim holds.
2. Then suppose that j =2 D (G0; h0). Let t denote the earliest period t in which
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t) 6= D (G0; h0; t) .
By the previous argument, we can assume that if r 2 D (G0; h0) \Ni, then N 0r =
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fig, as otherwise the node would have a null probability. Lemma 7 then yields
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t)  D (G0; h0; t) ,
which implies that
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t)  D (G0; h0; t) .
For any t  T , let K (t) denote the number of player in D (G0; h0; t). Then
" (G0; h0)  "
Pt
t=1K(t)
t
" (Gi ; h
 (hi))  f (Gi ) (1  ")nT " (1 n

1 )t

+
Pt
t=1K(t)
t
where the upper-bound in the rst inequality is obtained setting yk = 1, k =
1; :::;W , and x = 1 in (5), and the lower-bound in the second inequality is obtained
by setting W = nT and yk = 1 in (5), and noting thatPV
k=1 zk 
Pt 1
t=1 K (t)
t + (K (t)  1)t +P1t=t+1 nt
Hence, for some constant q0 > 0, when " is close to zero,
" (Gi ; h
 (hi))  q0" (1 n 1 )t

+
Pt 1
t=1 K(t)
t
Then
" (G0; h0jhi)  
"(G0; h0)
"(Gi ; h (hi))
 "
(1 n 1 )t

q0
and thus,  (G0; h0jhi) = 0 since 1 n < 1.
This establishes part (a) and implies that, if  (G; hjhi) > 0, player i believes that
D (G; h)  Ni [ fig.
To prove (b), observe that (a) implies that we can restrict attention to networks G
such that Nj = fig for any
j 2 D (Gi ; h (hi)) nfig.
We prove the claim by contradiction. Let t be the earliest period t such that
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t) 6= D (G; h; t) .
Observe that the same argument as in (a) shows that
D (Gi ; h (hi) ; t)  D (G; h; t)
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and the claim is proved analogously.
The proof of the main result of this subsection follows from the preceding lemmas and
Lemma 4.
Theorem 9 If A1 and A3 hold, and if  is su¢ ciently close to one, the strategy prole
N satises C, EP, and BFTS.
Proof. The strategy proles clearly satisfy C. We now establish EP. In particular it
will be shown that given the system of beliefs  of Lemma 8, it is sequentially rational
to comply with the equilibrium strategy for any prole of prior beliefs satisfying A3.
Fix: a player i 2 N ; a history hi of length T observed by player i; and node (G; h)
such that (G; hjhi) > 0. By Lemmas 4 and 11, for j 2 Ni and k 2 Njnfig, djk(h0) = 0
for any history h0 which has h as a subhistory and D (G; h0) nD (G; h)  fig. As in
Theorem 5, any player i believes that for any neighbor j 2 Ni, djk(h0) = 0 for any
k 2 Njnfig. Consequently, player i believes that the action of a neighbor j 2 Ni at any
history h0 is solely determined dji(h0). Verication of sequential rationality is identical
to Theorem 5.
EP holds given A3 as the strategies are independent of the prior. Also, BFTS follows
immediately from the previous observations since player i never expects defections to
cycle and since the number of Ds expected from a player in any of his relationships is
bounded by 2.
Comments
Provided that the ordinal properties of the games are the same across all relation-
ships, the robustness properties discussed in Section 3 are obviously satised by the
equilibrium strategy. Again, we can allow for uncertainty in the number of player, het-
erogeneity in payo¤s, uncertainty in payo¤s consistent with A1, and heterogeneity in
discount rates.
4.4 Arbitrary Graphs and l > 0
In this section, we study the Prisoners Dilemma with  < 1. We will show that there
exists a strategy prole that satises EP and C. The proof is an adaptation of an
argument rst used by Ellison (1994). First note that a simple grim trigger strategy
sustains cooperation for values of  in some interval
 
; 

. Then, cooperation can be
extended to any  2  =; 1 by partitioning the game into T   1 independent games
played every T periods and by playing according to grim trigger strategies in each of
the independent games. The number T is chosen so that implied discount rate T is in 
; 

.
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Theorem 10 Suppose that  < 1 and A1 holds. If  is su¢ ciently close to one, a
strategy prole that satises EP and C exists.
Proof. Consider a prole of grim trigger strategies such that:
(I) player i plays C if every player j 2 Ni played C in every previous period;
(II) player i plays D otherwise.
Consider the sets Ci  Ni, Di = NinCi, and  such that
1 > (1  ) (1 + g)P
j2Ci ij (1 + g) > (1 +  (1 + g))
P
j2Ci ij   l
P
j2Di ij
The rst inequality implies that if all the players adhere the aforementioned strategy,
no player has an incentive to deviate from state (I). The second inequality implies that
if a player believes that players in Ci are in state (I) and players in Di and himself are
in state (II), he has no incentive to deviate from state (II). The two inequalities reduce
to:
g
g + 1
<  <
g
g + 1
+
l
P
j2Di ij
(g + 1)
P
j2Ci ij
Note that the upper-bound is decreasing in
P
j2Ci ij and increasing in
P
j2Di ij. Recall
that, ij > 0 for any ij, i 6= j. Let
 =
min
ij, i 6=j
ij
(n  1) max
ij, i 6=j
ij
and suppose that
 2

g
g + 1
;
g
g + 1
+
l
(g + 1)

(6)
Then, if a player believes that at least one of his opponent has switched to state (II),
playing D is strictly optimal; otherwise, playing C is strictly optimal. Thus, the above
strategy is a sequential equilibrium, since consistent beliefs are such that:
(i) if every player j 2 Ni played C in every previous period, player i believes that all
players in the entire graph are in state (I) with probability equal to one;
(ii) if a player j 2 Ni played D in a previous period, player i believes that at least one
of his opponent has switched to state (II).
Moreover, the strategy is an EP equilibrium, it is optimal for any belief about the
underlying information network.
If the upper bound of the interval in (6) is greater or equal to one, the theorem is proved.
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Otherwise, consider an open interval (a; b)  (0; 1). If  2
a
b
; 1

, then T 2 (a; b) for
some positive integer T . Hence, if a =
g
g + 1
and b =
g
g + 1
+
l
(g + 1)
, partitioning the
game into T  1 independent games played every T periods (as in Ellison (1994)) yields
a discount rate:
T 2

g
g + 1
;
g
g + 1
+
l
(g + 1)

Thus, this modied strategy is an EP equilibrium for arbitrarily high patience.
Naturally, in the above result, cooperation is sustained at the expense of FTS and
BFTS. Indeed, a player who defects in one of the T games never returns to cooperation
in that game, which eventually settles on constant defection in the component of the
network in which the player resides.
Comments
An immediate corollary of Theorem 10 is that the result is robust to uncertainty
about the number of players as long as the support of the latter is nite. This observa-
tion is trivial. Since the size of the component to which a player belongs is uncertain,
allowing for additional uncertainty about the total number of players does not alter the
argument.
As in Ellison (1994), the strategy in the proof of Theorem 10 is not robust to
heterogeneity in discount rates, since all players must partition the repeated game
into independent games of identical length. Moreover, the strategy is not robust to
heterogeneity in payo¤s. In particular, even though l can be allowed to vary across
relationships, g must be common to all relationships for the proposed strategy to be an
equilibrium. Similarly, one can allow for the values of l and ij to be private information.
Although the equilibrium strategies violate FTS, since no player ever reverts to full
cooperation after observing a deviation, a di¤erent notion of stability (proposed by
Ellison (1994)) is satised. In particular, let the game be perturbed so that, in every
period, players play according to their strategy with probability (1  ") and choose D
with probability ". It is easy to show that the strategy in the proof of Theorem 10 is
a sequential equilibrium in this perturbed game for all values of  su¢ ciently close to
one and for " su¢ ciently close to zero. Naturally, the equilibrium payo¤s converge to
one as " goes to zero. Cho (2011) shows that with public randomization cooperation
can eventually return to cooperation after any history.
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5 Conclusions
The results in this paper show that, under weak conditions, in games with local moni-
toring e¢ ciency can be sustained by a sequential equilibrium that is independent of the
playersbeliefs on the monitoring structure. The stability of these equilibria and their
robustness with respect to heterogeneity and uncertainty in payo¤s and population size
was also discussed.
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6 Appendix
The appendix claries some of the results used in the proof of theorem 5.
Lemma 11 If A2 holds, there exists consistent beliefs  such that, for any history
hi 2 Hi;Ni observed a player i 2 N , if (G; hjhi) > 0 for some (G; h) 2 U(hi), then
D (G; h)  Ni [ fig.
Proof. Consider the trembles in the proof of Theorem 5. Given the sequence of
completely mixed behavior strategy proles "N obtained by adding these to the prole
N , let 
"(G; h) be the probability of node (G; h). The strategy "N is such that, for
every information set U (hi) of player i, the conditional belief of node (G; h) 2 U (hi)
" (G; hjhi) = 
"(G; h)P
(G0;h0)2U(hi) 
"(G0; h0)
converges as "! 0, since each "(G; h) is a polynomial.
Consider an acyclic network G for which f (G) > 0 and a player i and a neighbor
j 2 Ni. Consider any history hi 2 Hi:Ni and let h+(hi) 2 H denote the unique history
of play (G; h+(hi)) 2 U(hi) in which all players, but for players in Ni[fig comply with
the equilibrium strategy, that is, all the deviations observed by player i are attributed
to js behavior. Let hsi denote the subhistory of hi of length s, a
s
j the action of player
in period s, and dene
Tj =

sjdji(hsi ) = 0 and asj = D
	
The probability of history h+(hi) then satises
"(G; h+(hi)) = x(")y (")
Q
j2Ni
Q
s2Tj "
s
= x(")y (") "
P
j2Ni
P
s2Tj
s
since Lemma 4 applies, for j 2 Ni, djk(h+(hi)) = 0 for any k 2 Njnfig. The term x(")
is a product that includes the prior and probabilities of non-deviations, and y (") a
product of the probabilities of deviations to C by players in Ni directly observed by
player i (dji(hsi ) > 0 and a
s
j = C). Obviously,
lim
"!0
x (") = f (G)
Now consider any other history such that (G; h) 2 U(hi). Suppose that such a his-
tory displays a deviation to C which is not directly observed by player i. Then, by
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construction
"(G; h)  y(")"2
Thus, n 
1  < 1 implies that
lim
"!0
"(G; h)
"(G; h+(hi))
 lim
"!0
1
x (")
"
2 
P
j2Ni
P
s2Tj
s
= 0
since P
s2Tj 
s <
P1
s=0 
s < 2:
Consider now a history h0 in which all deviations to C have been directly observed by
player i. Let t denote the rst period in which djk(h0t) > 0 for some k 2 Njni. Then,
"(G; h0)  y(")"tQj2NiQs2Tj jst "s
Now, n 
1  < 1 implies that
lim
"!0
"(G; h0)
"(G; h+(hi))
 lim
"!0
1
x (")
"
t 
P
j2Ni
P
s2Tj js>t
s
= 0
since
n
P
s2Tj js>t 
s < n
P1
s=t+1 
s < t:
Since there are only nitely many histories in U(hi), it must be that lim"!0 
" (G; hjhi) >
0 only if h = h+(hi). Therefore player i believes that D (G; h)  Ni [ fig.
The following tables clarify the incentive constraints in the proof of theorem 5.
Each entry shows the payo¤ in periods following either no deviation or a one shot
deviation by player i from the strategy i when the relationship with player j was in
state (dij; dji). Payo¤s are omitted after a relationship returns to the state (0; 0). If
l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 0:
Equilibrium: C Deviation: D
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
(0; 2)
t t+ 1 t+ 2
1 1 1
 l 1 1
 l  l 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2
1 + g  l  l
0  l 1
0  l  l
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If l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1:
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
(1; 0)
(1; 1)
(0; 2)
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 + g  l  l 1
0  l 1 1
1 + g 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
0  l  l 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 1 + g  l  l
 l 1 + g  l  l
1 0 1 1
 l 0 1 1
 l 0  l 1
If l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 2:
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
(1; 0)
(1; 1)
(0; 2)
(2; 0)
(2; 2)
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
1 + g 0  l  l 1
0 0  l 1 1
1 + g 1 + g  l  l 1
0 1 + g  l  l 1
0 0  l  l 1
1 + g 1 + g 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
1 1 + g 0  l  l
 l 1 + g 0  l  l
1 0 1 + g  l  l
 l 0 1 + g  l  l
 l 0 0  l 1
1 0 0 1 1
 l 0 0 1 1
If l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 0:
Equilibrium: C Deviation: D
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
t t+ 1 t+ 2
1 1 1
 l 1 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2
1 + g  l 1
0 1 1
If l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 1:
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
(1; 0)
(1; 1)
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 + g  l 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 + g 1 1 1
0 1 1 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 1 + g 0 1
 l 1 + g 0 1
1 0 0 1
 l 0 0 1
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If l  0 and maxj2Ni dij(hi) = 2:
Equilibrium: D Deviation: C
(dij; dji)
(0; 0)
(0; 1)
(1; 0)
(1; 1)
(2; 2)
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 + g 0 1 1
0 1 + g  l 1
1 + g 1 + g  l 1
0 1 + g  l 1
0 0 1 1
t t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3
1 1 + g 0 1
 l 1 + g 0 1
1 0 0 1
 l 0 0 1
 l 0 0 1
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Abstract 
 
 
The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated two-action games with 
local monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of partners, of 
whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that for generic beliefs efficiency 
can be sustained in a sequential equilibrium in which strategies are independent of the 
players’ beliefs about the monitoring structure. Stronger results are obtained when 
players are arbitrarily patient and payoffs are evaluated according to Banach-Mazur 
limits, and when players are impatient and only acyclic monitoring structures are 
allowed. 
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